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 ABSTRACT  
The Responsibility to Protect Indigenous Peoples: A Study of R2P’s Potential 




This thesis analyzes the potential application of the United Nations principle of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in situations of mass atrocities committed against 
Indigenous peoples. R2P has never been applied in a situation of a mass atrocity 
committed against Indigenous peoples anywhere in the world and this thesis will question 
why that is, with reference to and analysis of the case study of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
(CHT) region of Bangladesh. The author argues that the conflict in the CHT is a clear 
case of ethnic cleansing of the area’s Indigenous peoples at the behest of the Bangladeshi 
government, making this an appropriate opportunity for the application of R2P. This 
thesis uses the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) as a normative framework through which the author assesses the Indigenous 
right to self-determination as it pertains to mass atrocity prevention and intervention in 
Indigenous communities. The author evaluates how R2P could be better shaped to 
address situations of mass atrocities involving Indigenous peoples, and how this 
paradigm shift may affect future iterations of the Responsibility to Protect as an evolving 
norm.  
Keywords: Responsibility to Protect, Indigenous, genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass 
atrocity, humanitarian intervention, human rights, protection of civilians. 
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I. Introduction 
“The atrocity crimes that stain humanity’s conscience make it imperative that 
leaders transform R2P [Responsibility to Protect] from a vital principle into visible 
practice.”1 
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made this statement in an 
informal dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect—frequently abbreviated to R2P or 
RtoP—on the occasion of the principle’s tenth anniversary in September of 2015. 
According to its supporters, this concept has achieved major, tangible successes since it 
was adopted in paragraphs 138-140 of the World Summit Outcome Document in 2005.2 
However, the norm’s applications and its sheer existence have not been devoid of 
controversies.  
Gareth Evans, in The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocities Once and 
For All, stated that R2P must be invoked at the earliest possible point to protect 
vulnerable populations facing mass atrocities.3 Indigenous peoples the world over are 
marginalized and made vulnerable to targeted violence due to structural and systemic 
inequalities, outright discrimination, and the legacies of colonial oppression. Yet an R2P 
intervention has never been invoked in the instance of a mass atrocity committed against 
Indigenous peoples, despite evidence of targeted violence in many countries that would 
																																																								1	United	Nations	“Secretary-General’s	Remarks	to	General	Assembly	Informal	Interactive	Dialogue	on	‘	A	Vital	and	Enduring	Commitment:	Implementing	the	Responsibility	to	Protect’	[As	Delivered],”	(New	York,	United	States	of	America:	United	Nations,	September	8,	2015)	http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8950.	2	A/RES/60/1,	"2005	World	Summit	Outcome.	Resolution	Adopted	by	the	United	Nations	General	Assembly"	(New	York,	United	States	of	America:	United	Nations,	October	24,	2005),	http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf.	3	Gareth	Evans,	The	Responsibility	to	Protect:	Ending	Mass	Atrocities	Once	and	For	All	(Washington,	D.C.,	United	States	of	America:	Brookings	Institution	Press,	2008),	79,	http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2008/responsibilitytoprotect.	
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fall under one or more of the four crimes that invoke R2P: crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing.4 
Today in Bangladesh, for example, there is a clear case of systemic violence against 
Indigenous peoples that is underreported and still actively occurring. In the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts (CHT) in south-eastern Bangladesh, the local Indigenous peoples have been 
socially, economically and politically marginalized for decades,5,6 while violence has 
steadily been perpetrated against them with impunity.7,8 There was a Peace Accord signed 
to protect Indigenous lands and foster self-governing institutions in the CHT in 1997,9 but 
it has not been effectively implemented.10,11 Under the premise of land disputes, the 
Bangladesh government has ordered this entire area of the country militarized and there 
are substantiated reports of targeted rapes, looting, burning of houses as well as arson of 
religious sites and murders of Indigenous peoples in this region.12,13 Why has R2P not yet 
even been mentioned within official United Nations documents on this conflict? Is it an 
appropriate mechanism for intervention in this instance?  																																																								4	A/RES/60/1.	para.	139.		5	Dr.	Salahuddin	Aminuzzaman,	“Bangladesh:	A	Critical	Review	of	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tract	(CHT)	Peace	Accord,”	Working	Paper	(Bangkok,	Thailand:	United	Nations	Development	Programme,	Regional	Centre	Serving	Asia	and		Pacific,	2005),	22.	6	“Bangladesh:	Human	Rights	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts”	(London,	United	Kingdom:	Amnesty	International,	July	31,	1991),	8–14.	7	Dr	Ishtiaq	Jamil	and	Pranab	Kumar	Panday,	“The	Elusive	Peace	Accord	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	of	Bangladesh	and	the	Plight	of	the	Indigenous	People,”	Commonwealth	&	Comparative	Politics	46,	no.	4	(November	1,	2008):	465.	8	Mark	Levene,	“The	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts:	A	Case	Study	in	the	Political	Economy	of	‘Creeping’	Genocide,”	Third	World	Quarterly	20,	no.	2	(April	1999):	359.	9	“Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	Peace	Accord	(CHT),”	Peace	Accords	Matrix,	Kroc	Institute	for	International	
Peace	Studies,	University	of	Notre	Dame,	accessed	August	5,	2016,	https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/chittagong-hill-tracts-peace-accord-cht.	10	E/C.19/2011/6,	para.	2.	11	A/55/280/Add.2,	para.	71.	12	Jamil	and	Panday,	“The	Elusive	Peace	Accord	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	of	Bangladesh	and	the	Plight	of	the	Indigenous	People,”	465.	13	Bhumitra	Chakma,	“The	Post-Colonial	State	and	Minorities:	Ethnocide	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts,	Bangladesh,”	Commonwealth	&	Comparative	Politics	48,	no.	3	(July	1,	2010):	281.	
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To test whether R2P could be applicable in situations of violence against Indigenous 
peoples, this paper will first outline the history of the development of R2P and will 
discuss the literature around its normative and operational elements. This paper will use 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a normative 
framework through which the author will assess the Indigenous right to self-
determination as it pertains to mass atrocity prevention and intervention in Indigenous 
communities. Using the case study of the Indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts of Bangladesh, this paper then looks to understand if R2P could be an appropriate 
international humanitarian intervention mechanism in conflicts victimizing Indigenous 
peoples. This paper will conclude with an assessment of how R2P could be better shaped 
to address situations of mass atrocities involving Indigenous peoples, and how this 




This thesis will rely on a mixed methods approach, although one heavily focused 
on qualitative methods. In terms of quantitative methods, the author relies on data 
collected on human rights violations of Indigenous peoples by the military and violent 
attacks by Bengali settlers on Indigenous peoples supported by the Bangladeshi 
military.14,15,16 In terms of qualitative methods, the author conducted illustrative expert 
interviews and also relies on primary source documents from the United Nations.  																																																								14	“Militarization	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts,	Bangladesh:	The	Slow	Demise	of	the	Region’s	Indigenous	People”	(Bangladesh:	International	Work	Group	on	Indigenous	Affairs,	Organising	Committee	CHT	Campaign,	Shimin	Gaikou	Centre,	2012).	
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The author interviewed three Indigenous leaders from the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
of Bangladesh when they were in New York City for the May 2016 United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. They are Raja Devashish Roy, Chakma Circle 
Chief of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and member of the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues; Sanjeeb Drong, Secretary-General of the Bangladesh Indigenous 
Peoples Forum; and Krishna Chakma, Managing Director of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Foundation. These three sources provide relevant information as to the daily experiences 
of violence of Indigenous peoples in this region, which is not readily available via 
academic sources since this area is so heavily controlled by the military. Due to this 
heavy militarization, the author could not travel to this region and safely conduct 
interviews of larger groups of people; therefore, this research must rely on fewer, more 
in-depth interviews to illustrate some opinions on this conflict. It is important to 
recognize that there are differing views within the CHT Indigenous peoples themselves 
on whether or not international intervention is necessary or whether they believe this 
crisis can be resolved internally. Therefore, it is important to note that these interviewees 
do not speak for all Indigenous peoples who live in this area of Bangladesh and the reader 
must keep in mind that not all Indigenous voices from this area can or should be 
essentialized by interviewing a handful of Indigenous representatives. 
The author also interviewed Dr. Tone Bleie, professor at the University of the 




Chittagong Hill Tracts. Finally, the author interviewed Dr. Edward Luck, former Special 
Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. 
 Unfortunately, the Bangladesh Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New 
York only responded to the author’s queries for an interview with a referral to the 
Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs in Bangladesh. The author attempted several 
times to contact members of this Ministry, to no response. The Bangladesh Mission to the 
United Nations in New York has not replied to any further requests for interviews. 
 As for other primary sources, this thesis relies on various UN texts that trace the 
evolution of R2P back to its inception in 2000. These include the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)’s 2001 report entitled “The 
Responsibility to Protect” which highlighted the original three-pillared approach of this 
norm;17 the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document;18 the 2009 report by Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon entitled “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect”;19 the Report 
of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on UN Actions in Sri Lanka written in 
2012;20 the 2009 General Assembly debate on the Responsibility to Protect country 
																																																								17	“The	Responsibility	to	Protect:	Report	of	the	International	Commission	on	Intervention	and	State	Sovereignty”	(Ottawa,	Canada:	International	Development	Research	Centre,	December	2001),	http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.	18	A/RES/60/1.		19	A/63/677.		20	“Report	of	the	Secretary-General’s	Internal	Review	Panel	on	United	Nations	Action	in	Sri	Lanka”	(New	York,	United	States	of	America:	United	Nations,	November	2012),	http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf.	This	report	can	be	found	online	but	it	was	never	published	officially	as	a	UN	document,	therefore	it	lacks	a	UN	document	number.		
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statements;21 and statements made at the 2016 United Nations High-Level Thematic 
Panel Discussion on the Responsibility to Protect.22  
Additionally, this thesis assesses Bangladesh’s international obligations as per the 
human rights treaties the government has ratified, acknowledging any reservations they 
made to these.23 Bangladesh underwent the Universal Periodic Review of the United 
Nations Human Rights Council in 200924 and 2013.25 All three parts of the UPR 
reports—the sections written by the stakeholders, by the UN agencies on the ground in 
Bangladesh, and by the government itself—have subchapters that specifically address the 
situation of Indigenous peoples and minority groups, and thus are particularly informative 
on the various sides of this conflict. In 2011, the United Nations Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues produced a useful study on the status of implementation of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997, which included important recommendations for 
remedying the atrocities being committed in this CHT.26 In 2013, the UN published the 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and 
Consequences as part of a special Mission to Bangladesh.27 This document speaks of 
violent sexual assaults and other crimes faced specifically by Indigenous women at the 




published the Preliminary Findings of the Country Visit to Bangladesh by the Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, which speaks to the cultural oppression of 
the Jumma29 and other Indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts region.30 These 
materials directly contribute to the debate proposed in this paper as to whether R2P 
would be effective in the current conflict in Bangladesh, and whether the violence 
experienced by the Indigenous peoples of this region falls under one of the four crimes 
that invoke the Responsibility to Protect.   
 Finally, an analysis of such a sensitive topic requires that the reader be aware that 
the author does not identify as an Indigenous person and therefore writes with the many 
privileges associated with speaking from outside of the persecuted group discussed in this 
paper.   
 
III.  What is the Responsibility to Protect? 
a. History and Content of the norm 
In March 2000, then- Secretary-General Kofi Annan released a report entitled 
“We The Peoples: The Role of the UN in the 21st Century.” In what has now come to be 
known simply as the “Millennium Report,” Annan grappled with many pressing issues 
facing the world at the time, including how to respond to mass atrocities without violating 
the sovereignty of nation-states. In the report, Annan plaintively asks the following: 
																																																								29	“Jumma”	is	a	term	sometimes	used	to	refer	to	the	Indigenous	peoples	of	the	CHT;	the	term	comes	from	the	shifting	cultivation	(“jumma”)	traditionally	practiced	by	the	Indigenous	peoples	of	the	CHT.	30	“Preliminary	Findings	of	Country	Visit	to	Bangladesh	by	Heiner	Bielefeldt,	Special	Rapporteur	on	Freedom	of	Religion	or	Belief,”	United	Nations	Office	of	the	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights,	September	9,	2015,	sec.	IV(1),	http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16399&LangID=E.	
 8	
“If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, 
how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations 
of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”31 
In 2001, the Canadian government gathered a panel of international experts to 
create the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 
response to Kofi Annan’s call for a new global solution to such gross violations of human 
rights. The Commission released a report later that same year that outlined a three-
pillared approach called the Responsibility to Protect.32 This report envisaged a shift in 
the concept of sovereignty from complete and total control over the people living within a 
government’s territory to “sovereignty as responsibility,”33 meaning a dual responsibility 
to both recognize other states’ sovereignty and to “respect the dignity and basic rights”34 
of all those living within one’s own state. After extensive international consultation, 
ICISS established the three pillars of R2P: the Responsibility to Protect, the 
Responsibility to React, and the Responsibility to Rebuild.35 
In 2003, Kofi Annan appointed a High Level Panel of Experts on Threats, Challenges 
and Change to assess the United Nations’ ability to respond to the most imminent dangers 
to the international community. The report this Panel produced, in December 2004, 
endorsed the emerging norm of the Responsibility to Protect and even acknowledged the 
occasional necessary use of international military intervention to stop a government from 
																																																								31	Kofi	Annan,	“We	the	Peoples:	The	Role	of	the	United	Nations	in	the	21st	Century”	(New	York,	United	States	of	America:	United	Nations	Department	of	Public	Information,	March	2000),	48.	32	“The	Responsibility	to	Protect:	Report	of	the	International	Commission	on	Intervention	and	State	Sovereignty.”	(Ottawa,	Canada:	International	Development	Research	Centre,	December	2001.)		33	Ibid.,	13.	34	Ibid.,	8.	35	Ibid.,	XI.	
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committing mass atrocities against its own peoples.36 Finally, R2P was officially adopted 
by all Member States in three paragraphs of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document,37 which was a major turning point in the international acceptance and 
formalization of the concept. The formative concepts of the norm had notably already 
been internalized by governments in many parts of the world, such as in 2000 when the 
African Union endorsed the principles of R2P in its Constitutive Act. Article 4(h) of the 
Constitutive Act even goes so far as to say that the Union has the right “to intervene in a 
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”38 
However, through the process of consultations with governments, civil society 
and academia, some of the core language of R2P was adjusted significantly from 2001 to 
2005. The 2001 ICISS report deemed the threshold for international intervention to be the 
point at which the state involved was “unable or unwilling”39 to protect its own citizens; 
the 2005 iteration of R2P raised the bar for international intervention to the point at which 
a state was “manifestly failing to protect their populations”40 from one of the listed four 
crimes, despite there being no clear guideline as to what that would mean in practical 
terms. In 2005, the original third pillar of rebuilding was implied but not named explicitly 
as it was in the ICISS report;41 additionally, the threshold and motivation for intervention 
																																																								36	A/59/565,	para.	201.	37	A/RES/60/1,	paras.	138–140.	38	“Constitutive	Act	of	the	African	Union,”	Article	4(h),	July	11,	2000,	http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf.		39	“The	Responsibility	to	Protect:	Report	of	the	International	Commission	on	Intervention	and	State	Sovereignty,”	29.	40	A/RES/60/1,	para.	139.	41	A/RES/60/1,	paras.	138–140.	
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had been adjusted and so had the emphasis on rules of use of force.42 The ICISS report 
highlighted the following for justifying military intervention where the government was 
not protecting its population: a “large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with 
genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state 
neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation or large scale ‘ethnic cleansing,’ 
actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or 
rape.”43 In a major adjustment from 2001, the 2005 iteration of R2P clearly delineated 
four crimes that would invoke R2P: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
ethnic cleansing.44    
Genocide has been a clearly defined crime since the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment for the Crime of Genocide entered into force in 1951. This 
Convention establishes genocide as any of the following acts, as long as they are 
committed “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group”:  
“(a) Killing members of the group; 
 (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
 (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
 (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
 (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”45 																																																								42	Ibid.	43	“The	Responsibility	to	Protect:	Report	of	the	International	Commission	on	Intervention	and	State	Sovereignty,”	32.	44	A/RES/60/1,	para.	138.	45	“Convention	on	the	Prevention	and	Punishment	of	the	Crimes	of	Genocide”	(United	Nations	General	Assembly,	December	9,	1948),	para.	2.	
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Crimes against humanity were defined much later, in 1998, with the Rome Statute 
treaty that established the International Criminal Court. While the actions that constitute 
crimes against humanity are too numerous to list here, their defining feature is that they 
are “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack.”46 These crimes include rape, torture and 
enforced disappearances.47 War crimes are also defined in the Rome Statute, which came 
into force in 2002. These include any violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
including Common Article 3 relating to persons not taking active part in hostilities, or 
“other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed 
conflict, within the established framework of international law.”48 Ethnic cleansing, 
however, is not defined in any of the aforementioned treaties. According to the Final 
Report of the Commission of Experts that was established by the United Nations to 
investigate violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, 
“‘ethnic cleansing’ means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or 
intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.”49 This definition was 
further clarified to mean “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group 
to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic 
or religious group from certain geographic areas”; this is typically “carried out in the 
name of misguided nationalism”50 and its “purpose appears to be the occupation of 																																																								46	“Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court”	(United	Nations	General	Assembly,	July	17,	1998),	Article	7.	47	Ibid.	48	Ibid.,	Article	8.	49	S/25274	(New	York,	United	States	of	America:	United	Nations	Security	Council,	February	10,	1993),	para.	55.	50	S/1994/674	(New	York,	United	States	of	America:	United	Nations	Security	Council,	May	27,	1994),	para.	130.	
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territory to the exclusion of the purged group or groups.”51 However despite naming the 
four crimes that would invoke R2P, there is no clarification in the 2005 World Outcome 
Document as to which of these actions, or at what threshold, would invoke which or any 
kind of international response—political, economic, diplomatic, or military.  
Some criticized the 2005 adopted norm as “R2P Lite.”52 This version of R2P did 
not retain such a strong focus on the responsibility or obligation of the international 
community—and particularly the Security Council—to step in when gross violations of 
human rights were being committed, but rather stated that the Security Council must be 
“standing ready”53 to help when necessary. Additionally, the version of R2P agreed upon 
at the 2005 World Summit denied practically any other way for states to intervene aside 
from Security Council approval,54 unless the General Assembly converged under the 
“Uniting for Peace” process as per UN Resolution 377, which has never been used to 
invoke R2P.55 The Responsibility to Protect as it was adopted in 2005 sticks to a rigid 
reading of the UN Charter, stating that “collective action”56 against war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocide or ethnic cleansing have to go “through the Security 
Council”57 for approval. Yet the 2001 predecessor to this document conceded that: “The 
Security Council should take into account … that, if it fails to discharge its responsibility 
to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned states may 																																																								51	Ibid.	52	Thomas	G.	Weiss,	Humanitarian	Intervention:	War	and	Conflict	in	the	Modern	World,	2nd	ed.	(Cambridge,	United	Kingdom:	Polity,	2012),	127.	53	Alex	J.	Bellamy,	“The	Responsibility	to	Protect	and	the	Problem	of	Military	Intervention,”	
International	Affairs	(Royal	Institute	of	International	Affairs	1944-)	84,	no.	4	(2008):	127.	54	Ibid.	55	“Security	Council	Deadlocks	and	Uniting	for	Peace:	An	Abridged	History”	(Security	Council	Report,	October	2013),	http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Security_Council_Deadlocks_and_Uniting_for_Peace.pdf.	56	A/RES/60/1,	para.	139.	57	Ibid.	
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not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation – and that the 
stature and credibility of the United Nations may suffer thereby.”58 The 2005 iteration of 
the norm made R2P more difficult to invoke, as any of the permanent members of the 
Security Council could simply veto intervention and the action would be blocked from 
proceeding, even if countless lives were being lost. Disagreement among the Security 
Council members has proven to be “particularly damaging in the early stages of a crisis 
when space for dialogue is wider.”59 
Yet R2P continued to gain traction within the United Nations and in member state 
capitals; it was first mentioned in the Security Council in April 2006, in a resolution 
regarding the protection of civilians in armed conflict.60 In January 2009, Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon released his report “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,” 
which was essential for the progression of R2P as it addressed the practical application of 
the norm in country-specific situations.61 In that report, the Secretary-General outlined 
his strategy around the three pillars of the norm. 
A wide-ranging debate on the subject—the longest General Assembly debate of 
the year, lasting three days—ensued in July 2009.62 Since then, Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon has released a report every year on various components of R2P and has even 
appointed a Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, thereby strongly expressing 
his support for the norm and its proliferation within the UN system. Additionally, the 																																																								58	“The	Responsibility	to	Protect:	Report	of	the	International	Commission	on	Intervention	and	State	Sovereignty,”	XIII.	59	A/70/999-S/2016/620,	"Mobilizing	Collective	Action:	The	next	Decade	of	the	Responsibility	to	Protect,	Report	of	the	Secretary-General"	(New	York,	United	States	of	America:	United	Nations	General	Assembly,	July	22,	2016),	para.	15.	60	S/RES/1674	(New	York,	United	States	of	America:	United	Nations	Security	Council,	April	28,	2006),	http://www.refworld.org/docid/4459bed60.html.	61	A/63/677,	para.	51.	62	A/63/PV.98;	A/63/PV.99;	A/63/PV.100;	A/63/PV.101.	
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Security Council has invoked the Responsibility to Protect in various resolutions as they 
have addressed crises ranging from South Sudan in 201163 to the Central African 
Republic in 2013.64 In April 2014, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2150, which 
reaffirmed the importance of the Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention 
of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect.65 As of 2016, the protection of civilians 
component of R2P has been incorporated in or guided ten Human Rights Council 
Resolutions and 40 Security Council Resolutions.66  
While the Responsibility to Protect has changed since its initial conception, the 
norm has also made significant progress in terms of its acceptance within the United 
Nations system since Kofi Annan’s first call for a genocide prevention mechanism in 
2001 to combat atrocities like those that occurred in Srebrenica and Rwanda. Despite the 
extent to which the principle has been internalized among some Member States and 
within parts of the UN system, however, R2P is still an emerging norm that continues to 
be contentious among states, civil society and academics.   
 
III.  What is the Responsibility to Protect? 
b. Debates on the Responsibility to Protect: Literature Review on the 
Normative Aspects 
 The academic literature on the Responsibility to Protect can be divided into two 
categories: debates on its normative elements and assessments of its operationalization 																																																								63	S/RES/1996	(New	York,	United	States	of	America:	United	Nations	Security	Council,	July	8,	2011),	http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmis/documents/sres1996_2011.pdf.	64	S/RES/2121	(New	York,	United	States	of	America:	United	Nations	Security	Council,	October	10,	2013),	http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2121(2013).	65	S/RES/2150	(New	York,	United	States	of	America:	United	Nations	Security	Council,	April	16,	2014),	http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2150(2014).	66	A/70/999-S/2016/620,	para.	7.	
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and why and how it has been applied. This section will address the former, while the 
latter will be addressed in the following subchapter. The Responsibility to Protect has 
been a contentious norm since its inception and there are many scholarly debates 
pertaining to the norm. For the purposes of this research, the author will focus on the 
literature analyzing three components of R2P: who are the subjects of R2P interventions, 
the debates around sovereignty as it pertains to R2P, and the principle’s roots in 
imperialist values. 
 The subject of any R2P intervention is framed as a “population”67 as per Francis 
Deng’s initial conceptualization of “sovereignty as responsibility,”68 created during his 
tenure as the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons. However, the term “populations” refers to, as Bridget Conley-Zilkic describes, 
“objects of concern that can be studied, abstracted, queried, and deemed someone’s 
responsibility, but they are not primarily subjects”69 and this term serves to lump together 
oftentimes disparate communities who happen to share a geographic locality. This also 
removes agency from the subjects of these interventions.70 The logic behind who is 
chosen to be the subject of an R2P intervention is also unclear. Anne Orford asks who 
decides who will be the subject of intervention and, likewise, who decides what level of 




leaving power in the hands of those who commit abuses, the principle does not propose 
passing this same power to those who have been victimized so that they, in turn, can 
determine the kind of protection they feel they need.72 Rather, the power of determining 
the kind of protection necessary in any R2P conflict is passed to the broader 
“international community”73 which then decides the type of intervention necessary. Other 
authors concern themselves with the thresholds necessary to induce an R2P intervention, 
given the absence of general criteria within the wording of the principle for when an R2P 
intervention of any kind is invoked74 and the apparent inconsistent selectivity in 
addressing certain crises over others.75  
Much of the literature on sovereignty and R2P revolves around the 
reconceptualization of state sovereignty implicit in the Responsibility to Protect principle. 
The original 2001 ICISS report that envisaged the Responsibility to Protect stated that the 
shifting nature of the international community required a “re-characterization … from 
‘sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility.’”76 When states “manifestly fail 
to protect their populations,”77 the concepts of human rights and state sovereignty clash.78 
Alex Bellamy points out this inherent contradiction in the United Nations Charter, which 




yet permits war for the purpose of individual or collective self-defense when arms are 
taken up against a Member State in Article 51, and confirms the principle of non-
interference in states’ affairs in Article 2(7).79 Particularly when the subject of the 
intervention is a state that was previously colonized, such as is the case for much of 
Africa and Asia, these countries are typically wary “of attempts to revise the rules of 
sovereignty”80 as some envision R2P to do. Many non-Western states were concerned 
that they had only recently achieved statehood and the rights that come with it81 and so 
the concept of sovereignty as responsibility, not only as a right to govern one’s peoples 
the way one’s government chooses, was met with strong opposition by many formerly 
colonized nations on suspicions it may be abused by Western powers.82 Even Dr. Edward 
Luck, former Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide to former Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan and later Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect to Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon, acknowledged concerns about potential misuse of the norm and 
issues of selectivity in his assessment of R2P’s first decade in 2011.83  
The Responsibility to Protect principle also continues to be plagued by 
accusations of thinly cloaked Western imperialism.84 Linked innately to the suspicions of 
many former colonies that R2P will be used inappropriately in their states, some scholars 
have portrayed this principle as yet another projection of the interests of the world’s most 
powerful nations onto those with valuable resources and limited international influence. 																																																								79	Ibid.,	3.	80	Luke	Glanville,	Sovereignty	and	the	Responsibility	to	Protect:	A	New	History	(Chicago,	United	States	of	America:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2013),	176.	81	Ibid.,	180.	82	Ian	Williams,	“Dueling	Principles:	National	Sovereignty	Vs.	Responsibility	to	Protect,”	The	
Washington	Report	on	Middle	East	Affairs	32,	no.	7	(September	2013):	29.	83	Edward	C.	Luck,	“The	Responsibility	to	Protect:	The	First	Decade,”	Global	Responsibility	to	Protect	3,	no.	4	(December	1,	2011):	396,	doi:10.1163/187598411X603025.	84	Mallavarapu,	Siddharth,	“Colonialism	and	the	Responsibility	to	Protect,”	307.	
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Mallavarapu describes the entrenched nature of North-South power imbalances as 
extending to global governance as well as “old frames of colonial rule”85 which are now 
simply being resubmitted under the guise of the Responsibility to Protect. Mallavarapu 
invokes Makau Mutua’s “fiction of neutrality” in which the human rights regime itself is 
based on a paradigm of “savages-victims-saviors.”86 Mutua describes human rights, as 
framed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as falling within the spectrum of 
the “Eurocentric colonial project”87 and Mallavarapu, along with other scholars,88 fear 
that R2P is yet another iteration of humanitarian intervention in which one group is cast 
as saviors and the rest as outsiders or saved “others.”89  
It is at this nexus of debate around the agency of the subjects of R2P, concerns 
around sovereignty, and fears of Western imperialism that this paper situates the potential 
application of R2P in situations involving Indigenous peoples. There exists an extremely 
limited set of scholarly submissions on this topic, with only one academic chapter in the 
entire R2P literature devoted distinctly to R2P and Indigenous peoples. Federico 
Lenzerini’s chapter “R2P and the ‘Protection’ of Indigenous Peoples” touches upon the 






former are inherently powerful and have the means and will to do the protecting and the 
latter are vulnerable and cannot save themselves. However, his chapter focuses mainly on 
the responsibility of each state—what Lenzerini deems a “State R2P”92—towards the 
Indigenous peoples who reside within the state’s territory to acknowledge their rights as 
per treaties such as ICCPR and ICESCR, or even non-binding instruments such as the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The author speaks to the 
importance of any form of so-called protection being implemented with the utmost 
cultural sensitivity, yet does not acknowledge the broader colonial, imperialist history 
that would complicate any attempt to apply the Responsibility to Protect by the 
international community to situations where Indigenous peoples are involved.93  
There are, however, scholarly works on the Responsibility to Protect and 
minorities. The rights of minorities and the ways in which they are violated by the state 
are similar to those of Indigenous peoples in that minorities are often vulnerable to 
multiple forms of exploitation94 and they are frequently marginalized and cannot easily 
seek retribution for the atrocities of which they are the victims.95 However, minorities 
research diverges from the literature on Indigenous peoples in that the international 
minority rights regime is relatively under-developed in comparison to the international 
Indigenous rights regime and there have existed recognized differences between these 
two groupings since the adoption of International Labor Organization Convention No. 																																																																																																																																																																					91	Ibid.	92	Ibid.	93	Ibid.	94	Dan	Kuwali	and	Gudmundur	Alfredsson,	“The	Responsibility	to	Protect	Minorities:	The	Question	of	Protection	by	Kin-States,”	Europa	Ethnica	71,	no.	3/4	(2014):	68.	95	Nicholas	Turner	and	Nanako	Otsuki,	“The	Responsibility	to	Protect	Minorities	and	the	Problem	of	the	Kin-State,”	UNU-ISP	Policy	Briefs	(United	Nations	University,	February	27,	2010),	1,	http://collections.unu.edu/view/UNU:2936.	
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107 in 195796,97 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
in 2007. Finally, the Responsibility to Protect has, in fact, been invoked in cases of 
violence among ethnic minorities, for example in Côte D’Ivoire, Kenya, and Guinea.98 
Yet, R2P has never been invoked in a situation in which specifically an Indigenous group 
of peoples are the victims of one of the four R2P crimes by their state or by a third party.  
For the purposes of this research paper, it is key to understand the importance of 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in boldly 
changing the paradigm around the Indigenous right to self-determination and the right to 
full and effective participation in matters that involve Indigenous peoples.99 The 
UNDRIP represents, like all human rights instruments, a set of “minimum standards,”100 
but one that has established an entire normative framework for accessing justice for 
Indigenous peoples. These rights must be understood in the historical context in which 
they were created—namely, one in which Indigenous peoples have been oppressed, 
marginalized and persecuted for centuries—and they must be read comprehensively, as 
they are “inter-related, inter-dependent, indivisible, and inter-connected.”101 
Additionally, the creation of UNDRIP represents a watershed moment in the 




Indigenous peoples to both conserve their own practices of conflict resolution and 
societal organization but also to “participate equally in the global normative arena.”102 
The hard-fought establishment of this set of rights—and its recognition by most 
governments the world over—demonstrate that Indigenous peoples are not simply the 
passive recipients of Western interventions but rather have the right to be active 
participants in the creation of their futures and the futures of their societies. In relation to 
R2P, Liss argues that the right to self-determination, such as is outlined in UNDRIP 
Article 3, in fact provides a foundation in which R2P’s rhetoric might be grounded, while 
R2P provides a possible framework and a minimum standard of operationalization for the 
right to self determination.103 In this way, the right to self-determination and the 
Responsibility to Protect actually work to reinforce and ground one another. Additionally, 
Souillac and Fry outline how the concept of responsibility, such as that inherent to R2P, 
is aligned with conflict resolution methods intrinsic to many Indigenous peoples’ 
“existence and survival.”104 Unlike the United Nations’ previously typical response of 
reacting to crises that are already unfolding, R2P encourages prevention as one of its core 
building blocks. R2P acknowledges the interconnected nature of the world as it exists 
today; therefore, it could be argued that R2P might align with traditional Indigenous 
methods of conflict resolution that see the conflict resolution process as more than simply 
“a means to an end”105 but rather as part of a “consistent ethical approach to human and 																																																								102	Genevieve	Souillac	and	Douglas	P.	Fry,	“Indigenous	Lessons	for	Conflict	Resolution,”	in	The	
Handbook	of	Conflict	Resolution :	Theory	and	Practice,	3rd	ed.	(San	Francisco,	United	States	of	America:	Jossey-Bass,	2014),	608.	103	Ryan	Liss,	“Responsibility	Determined:	Assessing	the	Relationship	between	the	Doctrine	of	the	Responsibility	to	Protect	and	the	Right	of	Self-Determination,”	UCL	Human	Rights	Review	4	(2011):	61.	104	Souillac	and	Fry,	“Indigenous	Lessons	for	Conflict	Resolution,”	614.	105	Ibid.	
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cultural survival.”106 In this realm of atrocity prevention and conflict resolution, 
Indigenous peoples have much wisdom to impart on living cohesively not only with one’s 
immediate neighbors but also with the land, as there is no life without a healthy earth. By 
viewing R2P through the lens of UNDRIP, it becomes clear that a symbiotic relationship 
could exist between the two to strengthen one another’s impact and levels of acceptance 
and internalization at both the community and state levels. 
 
III.  What is the Responsibility to Protect? 
c. Debates on the Responsibility to Protect: Literature Review on the 
 Operationalization of the Norm 
 The Responsibility to Protect encompasses several potential methods of 
intervention in scenarios in which populations are experiencing mass atrocities—anything 
from diplomatic engagement to military involvement “should peaceful means be 
inadequate,”107 could be deemed an application of the principle. This leads to one of the 
first issues identified in the literature on the Responsibility to Protect: misunderstandings 
about exactly what R2P means.108 According to the Report of the Secretary-General’s 
Internal Review Panel on UN Actions in Sri Lanka109 and repeated in Luck and Luck’s 
“The Individual Responsibility to Protect,” the concept of R2P was mentioned in 
discussions at the United Nations during the end of the Sri Lankan conflict in 2009 but 
variations in understandings of the principle’s meanings and uses among Member States 																																																								106	Ibid.	107	A/RES/60/1,	para.	139.	108	O’Hagan,	Jacinta,	“The	Responsibility	to	Protect:	A	Western	Idea?,”	in	Theorising	the	Responsibility	
to	Protect,	ed.	Ramesh	Thakur	and	William	Maley	(Cambridge,	United	Kingdom:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2015),	285,	http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781139644518.	109	“Report	of	the	Secretary-General’s	Internal	Review	Panel	on	United	Nations	Action	in	Sri	Lanka.”	
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and the Secretariat had become so wrought with tension as to practically invalidate its 
application.110 It is worth noting that this occurred before the large 2009 debate on the 
Responsibility to Protect in the General Assembly and before Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon released his 2009 report on its implementation; however, in 2005, all Member 
States had already signed the World Outcome Summit Document that remains the 
guiding wording for the principle so R2P had certainly been discussed by this point 
among state representatives. Part of the issue with its operationalization in Sri Lanka, 
continues Luck and Luck, was the propensity among both world leaders and international 
institutions to see R2P solely as a “short-term emergency response doctrine”111 rather 
than as a potentially long-term project of response and peace building, as it was 
envisioned originally.  
However even recently, at the February 2016 thematic panel discussion on the 
Responsibility to Protect held at the United Nations in New York, it became painfully 
obvious as soon as the Member States began to contribute to the discussion that this 
principle is far from widely accepted. The mission representative of Kyrgyzstan, for 
example, took the floor in this debate to unequivocally denounce the assertion that their 
country is an example of R2P’s successful implementation during ethnic conflicts that 




principle’s best applications during his panel speech.113 If even the countries named as 
successes of the norm’s operationalization refute the idea that R2P was ever applied in 
their conflict, this serves to reinforce the idea put forth by many scholars that all Member 
States do not unanimously understand the R2P concept in the same way.114,115  
 Another major issue with the operationalization of R2P is Security Council 
inaction. As per Article 24(1) of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council bears 
“primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”116 and 
yet, thanks to a broad and complex agenda as well as multiple demands upon its 
resources, the Security Council is often only capable of focusing on immediate crisis 
situations.117 Even UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged in his 2009 report 
“Implementing the R2P: Report of the Secretary General” that the United Nations as a 
whole, and its Member States individually, are “underprepared”118 to meet even their 
most “fundamental prevention and protection responsibilities”119 as delineated by R2P 
doctrine.  In his final annual report on R2P as UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon 




move away from decisive action – whether for prevention or for response.”120 As argued 
by Cannizzaro, the United Nations Charter rules of procedure do not allow for a timely 
response to situations of crisis even if the political will is present, thereby denying the 
UN its ability to fulfill its mandate to protect human rights.121 Cannizzaro argues that the 
United Nations is not prepared to undertake the responsibilities entrusted to it by R2P to 
both identify mass atrocities and to undertake decisive action to stop them, given its 
hulking bureaucracy and other limitations intrinsic to the UN system.122 Yet other authors 
argue it is a lack of political will, rather than constraints on capacity, that limit Security 
Council involvement in emerging or active situations of mass atrocities.123  
 Finally, debates continue to rage around the third pillar of R2P, labeled “Timely 
and Decisive Response”124 but referring, among other things, to military intervention 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. O’Hagan describes the recurring debates around 
misappropriation of the military component of R2P for regime change, rather than 
protection of civilians.125 This is best illustrated in R2P’s application in Libya in 2011, in 
which Chandler describes how R2P’s military intervention component was applied 




of the Responsibility to Protect in this instance was, however, heralded as a success at the 
time by many of its norm entrepreneurs. Gareth Evans described it as “a textbook case of 
the R2P norm working exactly as it was supposed to”127 and UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon remarked, “By now it should be clear to all that the Responsibility to Protect 
has arrived.”128 While it is not unanimously agreed that R2P was the driving factor 
behind this operation, it certainly is acknowledged as a major factor in the Security 
Council’s decisions and actions in Libya.129 This was a coup for the emerging norm130 
but five years later, this intervention is now recognized as a disaster even by those 
originally touting it as a phenomenal success. In a speech given at the UN in February 
2016, Gareth Evans described the “horrible aftermath of the initially-successful R2P-
based military intervention in Libya.”131 This confusion over the meaning of the R2P 
doctrine, concerns over the United Nations’ ability to apply the norm, and its 
questionable efficacy, all contribute to debates on R2P’s operationalization. 
 
IV.  Situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh 
a. History of Conflict 
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated 
countries in the world, with approximately 163 million people total population and 																																																								127	Gareth	Evans,	“Interview:	The	R2P	Balance	Sheet	After	Libya,”	in	The	Responsibilty	to	Protect:	
Challenges	and	Opportunities	in	Light	of	the	Libyan	Intervention	(e-International	Relations,	2011),	40.	128	United	Nations	Web	Services,	“Secretary-General’s	Remarks	at	Breakfast	Roundtable	with	Foreign	Ministers	on	‘The	Responsibility	to	Protect:	Responding	to	Imminent	Threats	of	Mass	Atrocities,’”	United	Nations,	September	23,	2011,	http://www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/index.asp?nid=5567.	129	Hehir,	“The	Permanence	of	Inconsistency,”	146.	130	Andrew	Garwood-Gowers,	“Responsibility	to	Protect	and	the	Arab	Spring:	Libya	as	the	Exception,	Syria	as	the	Norm,	The,”	University	of	New	South	Wales	Law	Journal	36,	no.	2	(2013):	605.	131	“Statement	by	Professor	the	Hon	Gareth	Evans	at	the	UN	General	Assembly	Thematic	Panel	Discussion,	26	February	2016:	Global	Centre	for	the	Responsibility	to	Protect.”	
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approximately 1200 people per square kilometer.132 The Chittagong Hill Tracts region of 
Bangladesh is located in the country’s southeast and is home to 11 or 12 Indigenous 
groups, depending on the source one consults, which amounts to roughly 500,000 
people.133 This population assessment is contested,134 however, and according to Jamil 
and Panday, there is a widespread belief that the government keeps the figure of 
Indigenous people “intentionally low in order to demonstrate the marginality of the 
Indigenous people”135 in comparison with the wider Bengali population. The Indigenous 
peoples of Bangladesh differ dramatically from the majority ethnic Bengali population in 
“language, culture, physical appearance, religion, dress, eating habits, architecture and 
farming methods.”136 While there are Indigenous peoples living outside of the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts in the plain lands of Bangladesh,137 this paper will focus primarily on those 
living within the heavily militarized CHT region. The CHT amounts to approximately 
10% of the country’s land mass and is vitally important to the government due to its 
location—bordered on the north and east by India, and on the south and east by 
Myanmar—and the abundance of natural resources found there, particularly gas, coal and 
copper deposits.138   
																																																								132	“Country	Profile:	Bangladesh,”	UN	Data,	accessed	August	5,	2016,	http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Bangladesh.	133	E/C.19/2011/6,	"Study	on	the	Status	of	Implementation	of	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	Accord	of	1997	/	Submitted	by	the	Special	Rapporteur,”	para.	1.	134	Chowdhury	and	Chakma,	Human	Rights	Report	2014:	On	Indigenous	Peoples	in	Bangladesh,	27.	135	Jamil	and	Panday,	“The	Elusive	Peace	Accord	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	of	Bangladesh	and	the	Plight	of	the	Indigenous	People,”	467.	136	E/C.19/2011/6,	para.	1.	137	Jamil	and	Panday,	“The	Elusive	Peace	Accord	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	of	Bangladesh	and	the	Plight	of	the	Indigenous	People,”	467.	138	Aminuzzaman,	“Bangladesh,”	4.	
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 Before it came under colonial British rule, this area was self-governed and its 
peoples—who were almost exclusively Indigenous—were relatively independent.139 
Even under the reign of British India, the CHT had the status of an autonomously 
administered district that was protected by the CHT Regulation of 1900, which banned 
the sale or transfer of any part of these lands to non-Indigenous people and limited 
immigration of non-Indigenous peoples into the area.140 Chiefs representing the three 
dominant Indigenous groups in the CHT collected taxes both for themselves and for the 
British and were recognized as kings.141 This special autonomously controlled status 
remained recognized through the next sixty years through the Government of India Acts 
of 1919 and 1935, and the Constitutions of Pakistan of 1956 and 1962.142 However, this 
special status was eliminated via a constitutional amendment in 1963 while the area was 
still under the control of the Pakistani government, and the restoration of regional 
autonomy was rejected again during the creation of Bangladesh’s first constitution in 
1972.143 Prior to the signing of the constitution, a delegation of CHT Indigenous peoples 
approached then-Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and requested 
the maintenance of autonomy in the region through an Indigenous legislature, the 
continuation of the offices of the three tribal chiefs or kings, and the re-
institutionalization of the agreement of 1900 including limitations on immigration into 
																																																								139	Amena	Mohsin,	The	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts,	Bangladesh:	On	the	Difficult	Road	to	Peace,	International	Peace	Academy	Occasional	Paper	Series	(Lynne	Rienner	Publishers,	2003),	16-17.	140	E/C.19/2011/6,	para.	5.	141	Jamil	and	Panday,	“The	Elusive	Peace	Accord	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	of	Bangladesh	and	the	Plight	of	the	Indigenous	People,”	468.	142	E/C.19/2011/6,	para.	5.	143	“Pushed	to	the	Edge:	Indigenous	Rights	Denied	in	Bangladesh’s	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts,”	(London,	United	Kingdom)	15.	
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the area of non-Indigenous peoples.144 However, Rahman refused these requests and 
advised the delegation to be on board with the project of national identity building, even 
going so far as to threaten to “effectively marginalize the Hill people by sending Bengalis 
into the region.”145 So began the long process of creating “a homogenous Bengali 
nationalism”146 codified in the constitution, with “no recognition of a separate status or 
identity for the Indigenous people.”147  
 Within a year, the CHT Indigenous political party Parbatya Chattagram Jana 
Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) formed an armed wing called the Shanti Bahini.148 The Shanti 
Bahini started a “low-intensity guerilla war”149 with the government of Bangladesh, 
although the fighting intensified following the assassination of the founding prime 
minister during a coup in 1975 when the military took control of the country.150 The 
military regime decided to deploy nearly a third of the Bangladeshi army in the CHT to 
control the recent surge of civil disobedience and outbreaks of violence;151 the army then 
started to bring into the CHT 400,000 Bengali settlers over only five years (between 
1979-1984) through its “transmigration programme.”152 This influx of Bengalis occurred 
without any warning, discussion, or consent of the inhabitants of the region,153 which 
violates the Bangladesh-ratified ILO Convention 107 in that the Indigenous peoples of 																																																								144	Ibid.	145	Aminuzzaman,	“Bangladesh,”	6.	146	Jamil	and	Panday,	“The	Elusive	Peace	Accord	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	of	Bangladesh	and	the	Plight	of	the	Indigenous	People,”	468.	147	Ibid.	148	E/C.19/2011/6,	para.	6.	149	Ibid.	150	Aminuzzaman,	“Bangladesh,”	7.	151	Jamil	and	Panday,	“The	Elusive	Peace	Accord	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	of	Bangladesh	and	the	Plight	of	the	Indigenous	People,”	469.	152	E/C.19/2011/6,	para.	6.	153	“Pushed	to	the	Edge:	Indigenous	Rights	Denied	in	Bangladesh’s	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts,”	27.	
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this area have the rights to their traditional lands and effective participation in decision-
making.154 It also violates the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in that Indigenous peoples have the rights to “traditional lands, redress, effective 
participation and free, prior and informed consent”155 regarding what happens on their 
traditional territory. In fact, the Bangladeshi government at the time denied there was any 
intentional program of Bengali settlement in the CHT when questioned by the UN 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, although the government later admitted the 
process had been deliberate after all.156 The CHT already had limited arable land because 
of the construction of the Kaptai lake when the area was under Pakistani rule, which 
flooded 40% of this territory and displaced 100,000 Indigenous people.157,158 The 
intentional migration process changed the demographics of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in 
a drastic way, with the percentage of Bengalis rising from 9% in 1951 to 26% in 1974 to 
41% in 1981.159 The Indigenous peoples were largely relocated to “model villages”160 
while Bengalis were settled in the original homes of those who had fled the increasing 
violence or those who were forcibly displaced, or beside military encampments in so-
called “cluster villages.”161 This same five-year period of time also saw the establishment 
of approximately 500 military camps in the region.162 
																																																								154	Ibid.	155	Ibid.	156	“‘Life	Is	Not	Ours’:	Land	and	Human	Rights	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts”	(Amsterdam,	The	Netherlands	and	Copenhagen,	Denmark:	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	Commission,	May	1991),	15.	157	Ibid.,	13.	158	Chakma,	“The	Post-Colonial	State	and	Minorities,”	285.	159	E/C.19/2011/6,	para.	7.	160	Ibid.	161	Ibid.	162	“Militarization	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts,	Bangladesh:	The	Slow	Demise	of	the	Region’s	Indigenous	People,”	10.	
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 The violence that followed included arbitrary arrests, disappearances, murders, 
looting and burning of Indigenous people’s homes and belongings by Bengali settlers and 
armed forces.163,164,165 There are also many reports of other “widespread and systemic 
violations of human rights of the Indigenous inhabitants … mainly perpetrated by 
Bangladesh security forces, including unlawful killings, detention without trial, torture, 
rape, destruction of houses and property and forcible occupation of [Indigenous] ancestral 
lands.”166 By the late 1970s, the Indian government began to help the Indigenous fighters 
train and arm themselves to attack the Bangladesh forces and Bengali settlers in the 
CHT.167 In the neighboring Indian province of Tripura, the armed Shanti Bahini group 
even formed a base supported by the Indian army.168,169 From this base, the Indigenous 
fighters were able to conduct offensives against Bengali settlers and soldiers that also 
included kidnappings, arson and murders.170 The military retaliated with several 
massacres, including the more publicized Kalampati massacre in March 1980.171 In this 
instance, approximately 300 Indigenous people died when the military began to fire on a 
group that had met to discuss the rebuilding of a destroyed Buddhist temple.172 Within 
the year, the Bangladeshi government passed the Disturbed Area Act, which provided the 
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“gave legal sanction to military carnage in the CHT.”173 It is important to note here that 
even official statistics on violence experienced by Indigenous peoples in the CHT may 
not be accurate, given the difficulties experienced by victims attempting to access the 
justice system. Devashish Roy, a Chakma traditional chief in the CHT and one of the 
vice-chairs of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, identified one 
of the issues in proving the scope of crimes committed against Indigenous peoples in this 
region as an inability to collect evidence and a lack of judicial options for victims.174 Roy 
used the example of sexual violence at the hands of Bangladeshi soldiers stationed in the 
CHT to explain how little confidence many Indigenous peoples have in the legal system 
in the region.175 He said the judicial procedures are often so complex and the military are 
historically so difficult to prosecute that many rapes simply go unreported.176 
However, peace negotiations finally began to gain some traction in the 1980s 
between the government of Bangladesh and the PCJSS.177 While the Bangladeshi 
government originally treated the Shanti Bahini as an insurgent, secessionist movement, 
they came to realize they were straining their international credibility by not at least 
negotiating with the group.178 In 1982, the Bangladesh government established a special 
economic zone in the CHT and later offered amnesty to members of the PCJSS and the 
Shanti Bahini in 1983 and again in 1985.179 However, despite discussions with 
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successive governments, there were few breaks in the fighting and limited progress in 
terms of finding a mutually beneficial agreement to this conflict until the mid-1990s.180 
It is important to also note that, while the Indigenous peoples of the CHT region 
have undoubtedly been violently targeted by the Bangladeshi state and settlers as early as 
the 1970s, they fought back through the Shanti Bahini armed group and committed 
crimes of their own against those they felt were encroaching on their lands and their 
lives.181 To say that populations are vulnerable does not mean that they are entirely 
innocent, which of course further complicates this already protracted conflict. 
 
IV. Situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh 
b. 1997 Peace Accord  
This “partly civil, partly military conflict”182 had ruined so many lives that 
finally, in the mid-1990s, both sides of the conflict began to take the peace process 
seriously. Meetings that occurred under the Ershad government had resulted in the 
creation of three Hill District Councils (HDCs) in 1989 that were composed of a two-
thirds majority of Indigenous representatives and an Indigenous chairperson.183 However, 
due to the very restricted autonomy permitted to these councils, they failed to gain the 
confidence of most Indigenous peoples in the CHT and the fighting continued 
unabated.184 These councils did not have the authority or resources to address major 
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Indigenous peoples who now had no homes to which they could return.185 Further rounds 
of talks occurred among the PCJSS, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), the Awami 
League and Jamaat-e-Islami in 1992 and these did lead to the Indigenous political party 
agreeing to a “one-sided ceasefire”186 in which the PCJSS put down their arms;187 this 
cease-fire was renewed every three months from August 1, 1992 until December 1997.188 
 Finally, in October 1996, then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina set up the National 
Committee on CHT.189 After over a year of meetings between the National Committee 
and the PCJSS, the two groups agreed to a peace treaty that was signed on December 2, 
1997.190 This was considered a success for both the government and the Indigenous 
representatives from the CHT, since concessions were made that both sides considered 
victories.191 
The text of the peace agreement, from which the following information is drawn, 
is split into four categories. Part A, entitled “General,” recognizes the CHT as a Tribal 
Populated Region and agrees to the creation of an Implementation Committee to oversee 
the enactment of the peace accord.192 The Committee would be made up of three people: 
an individual nominated by the Prime Minister, a Chairman of the Task Force formed as 
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Tracts Local Government Council/Hill District Council,” sets out that every non-
Indigenous resident who owns land “legally”194 in the CHT will now be labeled as a 
“non-tribal permanent resident”;195 additionally, the Hill District Councils would have 
expanded authority to include jurisdiction over land management, local police, “tribal law 
and social justice,”196 and “environmental preservation and development,”197 among 
others. Part C, entitled “Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council,” outlined the 
development of a regional authority that would reserve two-thirds of the seats and the 
chairperson role for an Indigenous person from the area.198 Finally, Part D entitled 
“Rehabilitation, General Amnesty and Other Matters” included many important 
components for the CHT’s Indigenous peoples, including the provision by the 
government of “two acres of land to each landless family”;199 the creation of a 
Commission made up of majority Indigenous members who have the authority—with no 
right to appeal—of cancelling the ownership of lands that have been so far illegally 
occupied;200 the granting of scholarships to Indigenous youth by the government so that 
they can partake equally in the national educational system;201 the maintenance of the 
separate cultures and traditions of the CHT Indigenous peoples;202 guaranteed amnesty 
for those PCJSS members who would give up their arms within the following 45 days;203 
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and finally, the withdrawal of the military from the CHT aside from a few designated 
permanent military outposts.204 The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord was signed in 
the Bengali language in Dhaka, Bangladesh on December 2, 1997, by Jyotirindra 
Bodhipriya Larma, the President of the PCJSS, and by Abul Hasanat Abdullah, on behalf 
of the Bangladesh government.205  
The signing of the Accord created hope on both sides of the conflict, although it is 
worth noting that the provisions of the Accord were not mandated by any particular time 
frame and there was “no independent body overseeing its implementation.”206 
Additionally, the Accord was not and is still today not protected by the Bangladesh 
Constitution; this means that any incoming government that does not agree to devolve 
power over the CHT to the tribal authorities could potentially enact legislature to 
eliminate the accord or reduce its power.207  
The Awami League, which was in power during the signing of the accord in 1997, 
continued to lead the government for another four years during which time some 
initiatives were taken to honor the agreed-upon provisions of the accord.208 The 
international image of the Bangladesh government had greatly benefited from its 
commitment to the peace accord, and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina even won the 
UNESCO Peace Prize in 1999 for her role in the negotiations.209 But when the BNP took 
power again in 2001 through 2006, documented human rights violations in the CHT once 
																																																								204	Ibid.,	sec.	D(17).	205	“Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	Peace	Accord	(CHT).”	206	E/C.19/2011/6,	para.	19.	207	Ibid.	208	Ibid.,	para.	20.	209	Jamil	and	Panday,	“The	Elusive	Peace	Accord	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	of	Bangladesh	and	the	Plight	of	the	Indigenous	People,”	471.	
 37	
again began to rise.210 Kidnappings and extortion by local gangs exacerbated tensions, as 
these crimes were committed on both sides of the conflict.211 In 2007 through 2008, a 
state of emergency was declared due to increasing political tensions;212 Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon finally sent a high-level panel to report on whether the upcoming 
elections were in fact free and fair.213 Finally, the Grand Alliance government was voted 
into power, led by the Awami League, in late 2008.214 Their manifesto included the 
following: “The 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord will be fully implemented. 
More efforts will be directed toward the development of underdeveloped tribal areas, and 
special programmes on priority basis will be taken to secure their rights and to preserve 
their language, literature culture and unique lifestyles.”215  
 However, almost all external sources point to the fact that this has not yet 
occurred, despite campaign promises. In 2000, the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious 
Intolerance said that the failure up until that point to implement the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts Peace Accord “threatened the survival of the cultural and religious identity of 
Indigenous populations”216 in this region.  In 2001, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) expressed its concern over the “slow progress in 
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efforts in this regard.”218 While the Bangladesh National Report submitted to the United 
Nations Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review in 
2009 acknowledged tribal groups only to the extent that they “enjoy special quota in 
government recruitment”219 and in universities, and that there are specialized ministries 
working on issues related to the CHT, both the Compilation of UN Information Report 
and the Stakeholder Submissions Report submitted to the Working Group for the same 
UPR cycle had criticisms of the government for its continued marginalization and 
targeted violence of Indigenous peoples in this region.220,221 In reference to the 
implementation of the 1997 peace accord provisions, the Compilation of UN Information 
Report cited the Committee on the Rights of the Child as being “deeply concerned about 
the situation of children of the Chittagong Hill Tracts … and the lack of respect for their 
rights, including the rights to food, health care, education, survival and development, and 
to enjoy their own culture.”222 These concerns echoed those made in the 2006 UNICEF 
report “Excluded and Invisible: The State of the World’s Children” about the denial of 
basic rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child to Indigenous children in 
Bangladesh.223 The CERD noted in this same Compilation Report as part of the 2009 
Universal Periodic Review that there were substantiated reports of ongoing human rights 
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“arrests and attacks against Indigenous activists, political leaders, and communities by the 
security forces … or attacks against these communities by settlers with the acquiescence 
of security forces.”224 All of these human rights abuses violate the terms of the accord as 
agreed twelve years prior. 
By 2009, Bangladesh had already formally agreed to many core human rights 
treaties that its armed forces were also violating through the aforementioned acts, 
including accession to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination in 1979; accession to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women in 1984; ratification of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child in 1990; accession to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1998; accession to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Culture Rights in 1998; and accession to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 2000.225 While Bangladesh ratified the 
International Labour Organization’s Convention No. 107 entitled “Indigenous and Tribal 
Populations Convention” in 1972, they had not and still have not signed or ratified the 
updated Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, ILO Convention No. 169.226 
Similarly, Bangladesh abstained from the vote on the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007.  
In 2009, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues appointed Mr. Lars-Anders 
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on the Status of Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997.227 Baer 
met with the Bangladesh Minister of Foreign Affairs and the State Minister of the 
Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs to help inform his report, which found that 
“thirteen years after the signing of the Accord, it is clear that many critical clauses remain 
unimplemented or only partially addressed”228 such as those relating to providing power 
to local tribal administration and restoring original lands to the Indigenous peoples whose 
homes had been illegally occupied by Bengali settlers.229 While the Special Rapporteur 
acknowledged the hope that had been raised in 2009 with the Grand Alliance’s manifesto 
upon taking office, he felt that the reasons for the non-implementation went beyond 
political disinterest to forthright impunity for military leaders who have not been held 
accountable for their actions against the CHT’s Indigenous peoples, even at the level of 
the Bangladesh Supreme Court.230 The Special Rapporteur found that the Awami League 
had “little incentive to push for the Accord’s implementation”231 and the human rights 
violations experienced by the CHT’s Indigenous peoples in the 1970s and 1980s have 
continued through to today.232 At the time of the writing of the report, “military officials 
attest to the fact that one third of the army is deployed in the region”233 despite one of the 
clauses of the 1997 Accord being the withdrawal of all but permanent military outposts in 
the region and despite the fact that the CHT makes up only one tenth of the total land 
mass of the country. The Special Rapporteur additionally noted an incident in which the 																																																								227	E/C.19/2011/6,	"Study	on	the	Status	of	Implementation	of	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	Accord	of	1997	/	Submitted	by	the	Special	Rapporteur.”	228	Ibid.,	para.	45.	229	Ibid.	230	Ibid.,	para.	46.	231	Ibid.,	para.	47.	232	Ibid.,	para.	49.	233	Ibid.,	para.	50.	
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Ministry issued a letter to various government officials in the CHT advising them to use 
the word “upajati” to address the Indigenous or tribal peoples of the region rather than 
“adivasi.”234 Despite the fact that the use of the term “upajati” is mandated as per the 
1997 peace agreement,235 this still caused an uproar because “adivasi” is the Bengali 
equivalent of the term “Indigenous peoples” while “upajati” translates to “sub-nation or 
sub-ethnic group.”236,237 The Indigenous peoples of the CHT are referred to by other 
names as well, such as “small peoples/nations” or “khudro jatishotta” and “ethnic sects 
and communities” or “nrigoshthi o shomprodai.”238 This blatant disregard for the desire 
of Indigenous peoples in the CHT to be called their proper names essentially denies these 
peoples their Indigenous identities at the state level.  
It is, in fact, this issue of terminology surrounding the CHT’s tribal people that 
Iqbal Ahmed, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh, first commented upon in his statement following the release of Baer’s report 
at the tenth session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in May 2011. The 
information in this paragraph comes directly from his statement. Ahmed stated explicitly 
that “Bangladesh does not have any ‘Indigenous’ population” at all. He went on to say 
that the “ethnic minorities” living in the CHT experienced “sporadic unrest in that region 
from … 1975-1996” but that his government, under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Sheikh Hasina—the same Prime Minister who helped create and signed the 1997 Peace 
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government representative stated that “the Accord has nothing to do with ‘Indigenous 
issues’” and therefore the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues is not the appropriate 
place to deal with the Accord. Additionally, he called the Rapporteur’s report “lopsided” 
and reiterated his government’s stance that they do not recognize “the authority of the 
Forum to discuss the issue of CHT Affairs.”239  
 This consistent denial of the Indigenous identity of those being oppressed in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts contributes in a fundamental way to the conflict in this region and 
that has made the Accord even more difficult to implement. The 2013 Universal Periodic 
Review of Bangladesh captured many of the same issues that were present in the 2009 
UPR. The Compilation of UN Information report cited UNICEF’s assertion that 
Indigenous children living in the CHT still “often lack access to basic and specialized 
services”240 and “recommended that Bangladesh adopt specific measures to combat 
discrimination and inequity”241 against these children. The CRC similarly urged the 
government to ensure Indigenous children in the CHT are not victims of continued 
discrimination in their enjoyment of their basic rights.242 While the Bangladesh 
government, in their National Report for the 2013 UPR cycle, claimed that 48 of the 72 





being implemented,243 the Stakeholder’s Report of the same UPR notes that violence 
perpetrated against the Indigenous peoples of the CHT escalated steadily in 
2011/2012.244 Additionally, human rights violations by both state and non-state actors 
have continued unabated including “rape and sexual assault against women and children, 
killings, arson, gabbing of lands, unlawful arrest and torture, and structural forms of 
discrimination based upon ethnicity, religious affiliation and gender.”245 Large-scale 
attacks against Indigenous villages in the CHT were “often fuelled by extremist 
propaganda and hate speeches”246 and politicians and police were frequently implicated 
in their incitement;247 additionally, there were substantiated stakeholder reports that 
Indigenous peoples were continuing to lose their lands to Bengali settlers “with law 
enforcement agencies protecting the settlers.”248 When the author interviewed the 
Managing Director of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Foundation, Krishna Chakma, he called 
the CHT an “open prison”249 in which the military controls the lives of the Indigenous 
peoples who live there, including by limiting press freedom, freedom of religion, freedom 
of expression, freedom of movement and freedom of free association.250 Chakma 
describes Bangladesh as “one country, two policies”: the “Chittagong Hill Tracts is, since 
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independence, under military rule” and the rest of the country exists under a “so-called 
democracy.”251 
One may wonder why the government would take such extreme measures to 
remove or irrevocably damage the Indigenous communities of the CHT. These are 
targeted and systematic acts of violence, and the motivation for performing them is often 
cited as being part of the Bangladeshi exercise of national identity building.252 Simply 
put, the Bangladeshi government is still attempting to distinguish itself from the nations 
that once ruled this territory by establishing the Bengali identity: one ethnic group, 
homogenously Muslim.253 Article 9 of the original 1972 Bangladesh Constitution focuses 
on this unique Bengali identity: “The unity and solidarity of the Bengali nation, which 
deriving its identity from its language and culture, attained sovereign and independent 
Bangladesh through a united and determined struggle in the war of independence, shall 
be the basis of Bengali nationalism.”254 The identity of the Indigenous peoples of 
Bangladesh, including those living outside of the CHT, was further minoritized with the 
Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment in 2011. This amendment reinserted the phrase 
“trust and faith in almighty Allah” to replace the word “secularism,” a change that was 
originally made in the Fifth Constitutional Amendment in 1979 by military ruler General 
Ziaur Rahman.255 This alludes to the movement towards institutionalizing Islam as the 
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ruler General Hossain Mohammad Ershad in 1988, and which was retained during the 
Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment.256 Article 6(2) of the Fifteenth Amendment creates 
a one-ethnicity state with the following words: “The people of Bangladesh shall be 
known as Bangalees as a nation and the citizens of Bangladesh shall be known as 
Bangladeshis.”257 This Amendment denies the rights of Indigenous peoples to identify as 
such, rather than as Bengalis, under the state. When Indigenous peoples are identified in 
this Amendment, they are identified rather as tribes (“upajati”), minor races (“khudro 
jatishaotta”), or as ethnic sects and communities (“nrigoshthi o shomprodai)”.258 This 
furthers jeopardizes Indigenous peoples’ legal status and threatens their roles as citizens 
with equal rights under the Bangladeshi state. As Kuwoli and Alfredsson argue in “The 
Responsibility to Protect Minorities,” if the national rhetoric is constantly “dominated by 
vague, emotive questions of ‘national identity’, minority issues will be vulnerable to 
exploitation”259 and, in this case, the minorities in question will be subjected to 
discrimination and violence. At one point, there was even a large visual display depicting 
Indigenous women carrying flowers in the Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport in 
Dhaka, with the people in the image identified as Indigenous or “adivasi”;260 however, 
this image was removed as of 2011 in alignment with the government’s assertion that 
there are no “adivasi” in the country.261  
																																																								256	Ibid.	257	“Constitution	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	Bangladesh,”	Government	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	Banlgadesh:	Legislative	and	Parliamentary	Affairs	Division,	Laws	of	Bangladesh,	(June	30,	2016),	Article	6(2),	http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=367.	258	Ibid.,	Article	23(A).	259	Kuwali	and	Alfredsson,	“The	Responsibility	to	Protect	Minorities,”	68.	260	Chakma,	interview.	261	Ibid.	
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Ultimately, the legalization of discrimination against Indigenous peoples leaves 
no space for the Indigenous identities, cultures and languages of the CHT peoples to 
thrive in this newly formed country. Indigenous peoples ascribing to Buddhism, 
Christianity or traditional religious beliefs simply do not fit into the mold of the Bengali 
national identity,262 and therefore have to be removed from Bangladeshi territory or must 
be made to be so inconsequential as a percentage of the population that their traditions, 
cultures and belief systems will eventually disappear. The evidence provided above 
additionally indicates the Bangladeshi government’s intent behind their actions.  
Unfortunately, while the 1997 Peace Accord could have been the turning point in 
Bangladesh, this conflict seems further entrenched now than ever before. The ongoing 
militarization and discrimination against the CHT’s Indigenous peoples simply has not 
gained international notoriety the same way other conflicts have, aside from within 
Indigenous activism forums such as the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues263 and within some United Nations human rights mechanisms. The CHT 
Commission continues to issue press releases condemning human rights abuses such as 
murders and the impunity with which Bangladeshi military and settlers commit these 
crimes, but there simply has not been much traction on this issue beyond a relatively 
small dedicated group of people.264 This lack of international attention allows the 
Bangladeshi government to insist they are implementing the Accord as they 
simultaneously work to undermine it.  																																																								262	“Pushed	to	the	Edge:	Indigenous	Rights	Denied	in	Bangladesh’s	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts,”	15.	263	“Forum	Should	Consider	What	Role	It	Can	Play	in	Support	of	Indigenous	Communities	Trying	to	Resolve	Land,	Rights	Conflicts,	Says	Chair,	Opening	Day-Long	Debate,”	United	Nations	Meetings	
Coverage	and	Press	Releases,	May	25,	2011	264	“The	International	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	Commission	Expresses	Shock	at	the	Death	of	Five	Indigenous	Men	at	the	Hands	of	the	Military,”	Press	Release	(Dhaka,	Bangladesh:	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	Commission,	September	12,	2015).	
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As mentioned earlier, India’s support of PCJSS fighters did cause tension between 
the two governments and it is acknowledged that their involvement played a role in 
getting the accord eventually signed.265 This indicates that, even without being formally 
involved in negotiations, “third countries used as safe havens by insurgents can play an 
important role just by their action and non-action.”266 In the past, international donor 
governments and human rights agencies brought pressure to bear on the Bangladeshi 
government to finally establish the Accord, but this same level of pressure has not been 
applied in relation to the implementation of the Accord. 
  
IV.  Situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh 
c. Opportunities for International Intervention under R2P 
As outlined earlier in this paper, the Responsibility to Protect can only be invoked 
in situations in which one of four mass atrocity crimes is being committed. This author 
argues that the evidence provided above indicates that ethnic cleansing is occurring in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts and has been ongoing for decades. In Scott Strauss’s chapter in 
Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention, Strauss refers to the lack of a formal definition in 
international humanitarian law of ethnic cleansing but reiterates that this term is widely 
understood to mean group-selective “forced migration and mass population 
displacement.”267 While both ethnic cleansing and genocide require intent to target a 
specific group of civilians, the main difference between the two atrocity crimes is that the 																																																								265	Mohsin,	The	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts,	Bangladesh,	115.	266	Ibid.	267	Scott	Strauss,	“What	Is	Being	Prevented?	Genocide,	Mass	Atrocity,	and	Conceptual	Ambiguity	in	the	Anti-Atrocity	Movement,”	in	Reconstructing	Atrocity	Prevention,	ed.	Tibi	Galis,	Alex	Zucker,	and	Sheri	P.	Rosenberg	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2016),	24–25.	
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former refers to the removal of an ethnic group of civilians from a territory and the latter 
refers to an ethnic group’s destruction.268 In 2008, the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of Indigenous people sent a 
communication to the Bangladeshi government to express concern that the land-grabbing 
in Indigenous communities in the CHT was part of a “systematic campaign to support the 
settlement of non-Indigenous families in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, with the active 
support of the security forces, with the ultimate aim of displacing the Indigenous 
community.”269 The transmigration programme described earlier in this paper was the 
beginning of this systematic attempt by the Bangladeshi government to change the 
demographic composition of the CHT, which has continued with the unimpeded land 
grabbing and terrorization of the Indigenous peoples. Chakma Indigenous Circle Chief 
Devashish Roy and Secretary-General of the Bangladesh Indigenous Peoples’ Forum 
Sanjeeb Drong, in interviews with this author, independently called the programme an 
attempt to minoritize Indigenous peoples in the region.270,271 The displacement of 
Indigenous peoples was aided by increasing violence experienced at the hands of settlers 
and government authorities such as the military, which forced many Indigenous peoples 
to move across the border into Tripura, India, or seek asylum abroad. 
 Other authors argue that the violence experienced by the Indigenous peoples of 
the CHT rather constitutes a “creeping genocide”272 or a “slow-motion process of 
																																																								268	Ibid.,	25.	269	“A/HRC/12/34/Add.1”	(Geneva,	Switzerland:	United	Nations	Human	Rights	Council,	September	18,	2009),	para.	9,	http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-34-Add1.pdf.	270	Devashish	Roy,	Interview,	In-Person,	May	19,	2016.	271	Sanjeeb	Drong,	Interview,	In-Person,	May	13,	2016.	272	Levene,	“The	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts,”	339.	
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ethnocide.”273 Scholar Mark Levene cites Raphaël Lemkin in his analysis of the situation 
in the CHT: while Lemkin, deemed by many to be the originator of the term “genocide,” 
intended the word to indicate a “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of 
annihilating the groups themselves,” he still acknowledged that these actions did not have 
to include the group’s “immediate destruction” as long as they were part of an overall 
plan to produce the breakdown of the group’s “political and social institutions.”274 This 
could include the “destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even 
the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.”275 Levene argues that genocide 
represents “the extreme end of a continuum of repressive state strategies which might 
include marginalization, forced assimilation … and even massacre”276 although not 
necessarily in that order. While the rapes, looting, murders and even destruction of entire 
villages never occurred simultaneously in large numbers, they have occurred with enough 
frequency and over enough time to amount to mass atrocities against this specific 
population. As early as 1991 the International CHT Commission, an independent group 
of international activists and scholars who promote respect for human rights in the CHT 
and also promote the implementation of the CHT Peace Accord, issued a report entitled 
Life is Not Ours, which stated that “a genocidal process … threatens the hill people of the 




result of actions taken by the Bangladeshi military, who are agents of the state.278  
Dr. Tone Bleie, member of the International CHT Commission, stated in an 
interview with this author that the situation in the CHT could also be considered to “meet 
the criterias under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court … under Article 
7,”279 which indicates crimes against humanity. The violence currently happening in the 
CHT then certainly account for one, if not two or three, crimes that would appropriately 
invoke the Responsibility to Protect.   
At the outset of the conflict in the 1970s, the Bangladesh government initially 
tried to deal with what was an “inherently political and ethnic problem”280 by militarizing 
the entire area and by creating economic development programs through the CHT 
Development Board, established in 1976. However, the economic development programs 
were still run by the military and only served to concentrate power into the hands of those 
who already held it, which thereby “amplified prejudice, alienated the CHT people and 
increased their penury.”281 Dr. Tone Bleie points out that the human rights agendas of 
Scandinavian-backed development programming in the CHT have “become substantially 
less important”282 over the past ten years. Bleie argues instead that these agendas have 
been “substituted with a focus informed by a neoliberal agenda, in which economic 
																																																								278	Ibid.	279	Tone	Bleie,	Interview,	Skype	(Internet	Video	Calling),	June	13,	2016.	280	E/C.19/2011/6,	para.	8.	281	Jamil	and	Panday,	“The	Elusive	Peace	Accord	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	of	Bangladesh	and	the	Plight	of	the	Indigenous	People,”	469.	282	Bleie,	interview.	
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development based on private enterprise and public-private partnership is all-
important.”283  
Various United Nations agencies are also currently involved in small-scale 
alleviations to the conflict, such as the UNDP Local Trust Builder’s Network 
initiative.284 This project supports almost 150 local volunteers to promote conflict 
conciliation by training them in mediation techniques.285 The Local Trust Builder’s 
Network was created and is supported by the CHT Development Facility, which was 
implemented by UNDP with resources provided by the European Union, Sweden, 
Denmark and Japan.286 However, this initiative is occurring on an incredibly small scale 
given the enormity and intricacy of this conflict. Additionally, these trained volunteers 
are supposed to immediately approach local authorities with any simmering conflicts they 
detect at the village level;287 however, this system is predicated on the idea that the 
Indigenous peoples trust their local authorities and are not being simultaneously 
oppressed or even violently attacked by them. 
The 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord still represents hope for many on 
both sides of the conflict, as it has been the only tangible agreement between the PCJSS, 
representing many of the Indigenous peoples of the CHT, and the government. 
Additionally, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who signed the agreement, is once again 
leading the country; this further encourages both locals and international observers that 
the government may hold up its end of this arrangement, since the government leaders 																																																								283	Ibid.	284	“Empowering	People	for	Peace	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts,”	United	Nations	Development	
Programme,	accessed	August	8,	2016.	285	Ibid.	286	Ibid.	287	Ibid.	
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cannot fall back on the excuse that it was a different leader who signed the accord. 
However, according to interviews with some Indigenous leaders from the CHT, 
Indigenous peoples are still “fairly marginal actors”288 to the Bangladeshi political 
process and that would have to change dramatically in order to implement the accord in 
any meaningful way and achieve peace through this process.289  
The R2P toolkit encompasses many potential avenues for conflict resolution but 
its first pillar, atrocity prevention typically through early warning mechanisms aimed at 
deterring violent conflict, is far beyond being useful in this situation. These crimes have 
been proven to be occurring against Indigenous peoples in the CHT, with the complicity 
and often actions of state agents, and with the intent, as evidenced by long-term impunity, 
legislative and policy measures, to cleanse the area of Indigenous peoples or at least make 
them so marginal a presence as to render their groups inconsequential. Now what can be 
done within the R2P toolkit to resolve this situation? 
The oppressive militarization of the CHT has been identified as the most 
important issue to be addressed here, by scholars and activists alike. The removal of 
military encampments was an important part of the 1997 Peace Accord that has yet to be 
implemented and this author argues that it is international intervention to have this part of 
the Accord upheld that would be the most effective application of R2P in the CHT. The 
Accord was an agreement between the government and the Indigenous peoples of the 
CHT that the government says it is still committed to,290 so the international community 
																																																								288	Roy,	interview.	289	Ibid.	290	“A/HRC/WG.6/16/BGD/1,”	para.	109.	
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would not be forcing the implementation of an external agenda in Bangladesh. Still, it is 
important to question what form this intervention could best take.   
There is a movement among some Indigenous peoples of Bangladesh to push for 
an international mediator to step in to create dialogue between the various high-level 
actors involved in the Accord291 or simply to monitor the implementation of the 
Accord,292 which could fall within the R2P toolkit of diplomatic intervention. The 
Bangladesh Indigenous Peoples’ Forum has invited European ambassadors and United 
Nations representatives to meetings they hold in Dhaka to sensitize them to the situation, 
however the Forum has also faced push-back from the federal government for involving 
foreigners in what is perceived at the state level to be a domestic issue.293 External 
pressure through an international mediator could, for example, be used to establish a road 
map for implementation of the Peace Accord, as suggests Krishna Chakma, Managing 
Director of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Foundation, including the clause of the Accord that 
mandates de-militarization.294 Some still believe that sanctions or economic pressure of 
some kind applied by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, UNDP, and foreign 
governments, would greatly influence the Bangladeshi state to take action on the 
Accord.295 However, sanctions against the Bangladeshi government may not currently 
work effectively as a tactic to force implementation since the government “has a new 
confidence in dealing even with the most influential donors,”296 a confidence they did not 
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possess even a decade ago, and this may make the state less susceptible to economic 
influence to change their policies. 
The final potential application of R2P would be military intervention by a foreign 
force or a United Nations peacekeeping operation. However, this option was rejected 
unanimously by all those consulted for this thesis who actually live in Bangladesh and it 
has not been suggested by any of the literature accessed for this research. The consensus 
among all sources consulted is that more violence is not the solution to decades of 
violence; rather, an inclusive political solution appears to be the best option as long as it 
acknowledges the legitimacy of the Indigenous peoples of the CHT and their rights to 
their culture and languages, lands, modes of governance and self-determination.  
 
V.  Policy choices re: Protecting Indigenous peoples 
a. Is R2P an appropriate method of intervention to protect Indigenous 
peoples? 
 In determining whether or not R2P is an appropriate model for intervention to 
protect Indigenous peoples from either state or third party violence, it is important to first 
question why Indigenous peoples have been neglected from R2P interventions thus far. 
Using the Chittagong Hill Tracts to illustrate, this author argues the reasons for the 
international community turning a blind eye to the many situations around the world in 
which Indigenous peoples are the victims of violent conflict is a lack of strategic interest 
and political will; limited advocacy and international attention to pressure international 
actors to step in; and a state-controlled narrative that minimizes the violence taking place.  
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The United Nations Security Council, the only UN body with the power to truly 
invoke R2P and force other states to intervene,297 has an extensive mandate and limited 
resources. As of right now, the situation in the CHT has not gained significant 
international media attention to force other governments to intervene meaningfully or to 
commit to help get the implementation of the Peace Accord back on track. This inaction 
on behalf of the international community may in fact be entirely willful, since 
Bangladesh is one of the largest troop contributing countries to United Nations 
peacekeeping operations in the world298 and any pressure applied from other states may 
push them to withdraw their much-needed soldiers. Krishna Chakma, Managing Director 
of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Foundation, suggests this may be due to a lack of natural 
resources in the region that would make it attractive to international investors in the 
extractive resource industry.299 Dr. Tone Bleie argues that “Bangladesh isn’t important 
enough for the kind of international key actors which one could expect could propose in a 
persuasive way and have sufficient clout”300 to force an intervention of some kind. Bleie 
believes that “as long as there isn’t anything happening towards citizens from other 
countries on a grand scale,”301 the chances of international intervention are slim due to a 
sheer lack of political will. The CHT expert argues that only if this violence were 
affecting citizens from other nations—more than simply along Bangladesh’s borders with 
India and Myanmar—would there be a chance to seize international attention, since this 
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would indicate that “the political system and development in Bangladesh is something 
which threatens security and development”302 internationally.  
In an interview between this author and Dr. Edward Luck, former Special Advisor 
on the Responsibility to Protect to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Dr. 
Luck explained that international attention from the press, from NGOs, and from other 
governments, is more likely to be garnered in a conflict when it is clear that “one side … 
seems to be getting beat up by the others and has no recourse other than some sort of 
assistance.”303 As mentioned earlier, the Shanti Bahini has fought back against Bengali 
settlers and the military, even committing some of its own crimes.304 Certainly, they were 
in retaliation for what was being done to them by the Bangladeshi government, but Luck 
argues that these types of situations are “more difficult to resolve if the government 
perceives, and some of its supporters perceive, that it’s facing an armed rebellion because 
then the sympathies just are a little different.”305 Dr. Luck continues by saying that a 
completely different diplomatic toolkit—and a completely different set of experts—
become involved when the conflict is publicized more as a civil war and less as a bipolar 
situation of “aggressors and victims, perpetrators and the vulnerable.”306 Unfortunately, 
the Shanti Bahini has committed its own offensives against Bengali settlers and the 
military. Even though these occurred out of defensive necessity, and mostly in the past, it 
is more difficult to frame the conflict as a one-sided atrocity crime when “one portion of 
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the population has taken up arms against the government.”307 Additionally, the 
international community may not want to be seen as promoting non-state actors in their 
resistance efforts, as the principle of R2P itself is premised on the primacy of the nation-
state. When perceived as victims, those being terrorized fit more easily into the frame of 
civilian protection; but when they rebel against an oppressive nation-state, victims are 
quickly re-framed as perpetrators even if they feel that violence is their only option for 
recourse. Indigenous peoples in other parts of the world have also had to take up arms in 
order to retain even a small part of the independence, territory or self-determination they 
once had. Unfortunately, this makes justifying an R2P intervention in a situation such as 
this even more difficult, despite the fact that in many cases the choices were limited to 
engaging in the conflict or Indigenous peoples losing their homes or lives.  
 The issue of narrative framing is another reason why R2P has perhaps not been 
invoked where it has been needed in situations of mass atrocities committed against 
Indigenous peoples. For example, one of the only international interventions in the CHT 
has taken the form of economic development programs funded through international 
governments and agencies to alleviate poverty in this region. However, these programs 
entirely ignore the range of civil, political, social and cultural rights being denied the 
Indigenous peoples of the CHT in order to focus on economic development outcomes. 
For example, the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility is organized by UNDP 
with funds primarily from the European Union, Denmark, and USAID. Their activities 
are executed “in partnership with the Government of Bangladesh.”308 Since 2003, this 
Facility has been involved in a variety of activities including improving infrastructure and 																																																								307	Ibid.	308	“Factsheet:	Promotion	of	Development	and	Confidence	Building	in	the	Chittagong	Hill	Tracts”	(Chittagong	Hill	Tracts	Development	Facility,	2014),	1.	
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access to health and educational services.309 However, their main focus remains 
economic development.310 Even in response to a recent outbreak of Indigenous-targeted 
violence, the CHT Development Facility’s rapid response plan involved “livelihood-
focused early recovery assistance,”311 with over 150 households affected by this spate of 
violence provided with “direct financial support to establish profitable activities and 
businesses.”312 These activities—while helping the Bangladeshi government to fulfill the 
economic rights of the Indigenous peoples of the CHT, such as their right to work313 and 
their right to gain an adequate standard of living314—are still little more than a partial 
solution to a deep-rooted political and ethnic conflict that sees a whole range of other 
rights completely disregarded.  
One of the main issues with the way this and other development programs have 
envisioned the situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts is that the area is considered a 
“post-conflict zone.”315 When framed this way, the donors and agencies involved are 
released from addressing the civil, political and cultural rights that are still being violated 
in this region and can instead focus exclusively on economic development programming. 
For example, despite the fact that the Asian Development Bank report on their 2000-2009 
CHT project was released in 2011—the same year that UN Special Rapporteur Lars-
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Anders Baer released his damning report of the oppression of the Indigenous peoples of 
the CHT at the hands of their government316—the ADB only acknowledged a “20-year 
insurgency” in the CHT in the 1980s and 1990s.317 Similarly, on its current webpage, the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility describes the CHT as a “post-conflict”318 
area. The overwhelming evidence, however, indicates that the area is nowhere close to 
being beyond conflict as violence is actively ongoing.319 By framing the situation on the 
ground in this way, these agencies permit themselves to effectively ignore the rights still 
being violated and focus on the relatively easy fix of creating employment schemes or 
instituting micro-finance plans. Even if there is mounting evidence that human rights 
violations are taking place here, the involved governments and agencies may not want to 
acknowledge this: sometimes in instances of mass atrocities, United Nations “Member 
States and international agencies supporting countries under stress are not sufficiently 
open to messages that might challenge their view that these societies are moving in the 
right direction.”320 As Amartya Sen writes in Strategies of Economic Development,  
“when interests of groups differ and conflict with one another,”321 development 
programming will end up reflecting the aspirations of the more powerful of the two 
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programming—and the discourse around the conflict in the CHT—to suit their agenda, to 
the detriment of the CHT’s Indigenous population. 
 Now that the potential reasons for the neglect of Indigenous-targeted conflicts has 
been laid out, the question still remains of whether R2P is an appropriate intervention 
mechanism for Indigenous peoples or if there is a better alternative. Is there a way to 
apply R2P without further entrenching inequalities, some of which are rooted in 
colonialism? 
 Ultimately, for R2P to be applied in a situation in which Indigenous peoples are 
the victims of mass atrocities, these Indigenous peoples need to be acknowledged in the 
first place. If the state is the perpetrator of the crimes and does not acknowledge the 
Indigenous peoples for who they are—perhaps to escape the obligation to respect, 
protect, and fulfill the rights that come with that identity—then under the R2P doctrine, it 
would fall to the international community to step in and ensure these crimes were stopped 
from being committed. In order for this principle to be applied to Indigenous peoples 
specifically, it must also fall on the international community to acknowledge exactly who 
the people are who are victims in this instance. The United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognizes Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination 
and their right to have their Indigenous identity respected. The establishment of UNDRIP 
was such an accomplishment in the realm of Indigenous rights because it functions at the 
level of international law. The international community must accept Indigenous peoples’ 
assertions about their identities as Indigenous peoples; this has been put into practice by 
the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and its predecessor, the 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations. Therefore, the international community could 
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take the opportunity set by precedent to acknowledge the rights of Indigenous peoples 
even if the state within whose territory the Indigenous peoples reside does not 
acknowledge this same identity and set of rights. If nation-states are the ones victimizing 
Indigenous peoples for who they are, then the ability to recognize Indigenous peoples for 
who they are must shift to another entity—namely, the international community. Perhaps 
this could be incorporated into the R2P doctrine as the operationalization of the principle 
morphs over time. 
 One of the major criticisms of R2P identified in the literature review of this thesis 
is that “R2P cannot be neatly disassociated from the prior modalities of colonial rule.”323 
In “Colonialism and the Responsibility to Protect,” Mallavarapu argues that R2P “needs 
to be treated as part of an older and much wider global history of interventionism.”324 
This thesis argues that only by attributing more agency to local populations will R2P 
overcome this inherent weakness of the principle.  If the self-determination of “local 
‘non-state actors,’ civil society, social movements, indeed victims themselves”325 is 
better recognized by the international community and better incorporated into the R2P 
doctrine, atrocity crimes could not only be addressed more quickly but also perhaps 
prevented more widely. The only hope for international efforts to be mobilized more 
quickly is if there is accurate risk assessment and early warning, especially for minority-
related conflict.326 Agency of non-state actors means not only the right to have a seat at 
the table when international intervention is being contemplated, but also means crediting 
all kinds of non-state actors with the “intelligence to figure out what might work best for 																																																								323	Mallavarapu,	Siddharth,	“Colonialism	and	the	Responsibility	to	Protect,”	319.	324	Ibid.,	320.	325	Mégret,	“Beyond	the	‘Salvation’	Paradigm,”	576.	326	Kuwali	and	Alfredsson,	“The	Responsibility	to	Protect	Minorities,”	86.	
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their own political systems in crisis situations.”327 This last part—engaging local people 
from all sides to provide an internal analysis of their specific cultural, economic, social 
and political context—is key because “Western intervention or doctrines like R2P cannot 
serve as a panacea to deeper structural problems which an unequal international order 
itself has in various ways perpetuated.”328 Dr. Tone Bleie makes the case that, in 
Bangladesh for example, the conflict in the CHT is actually symptomatic of a “core 
structural issue of a neo patrimonial state, where the military is one of the well 
functioning pillars.”329 What is happening in the CHT, states Dr. Bleie, is actually 
“pivoting around a deep-rooted relationship between most of the political and military 
elites.”330 Bleie argues that in order to understand the oppression and victimization of 
Indigenous peoples of the CHT, one has to first recognize the role the neo patrimonial 
state plays in avoiding the implementation of the Peace Accord and, in particular, in 
refusing to “downsize the bloated army and put it to other kinds of civilian uses.”331 
 
This context-specific understanding of the situation on the ground only occurs 
when many actors—especially non-state actors—are included in framing the history and 
wider background to the conflict. Part of resolving the situation in the CHT may include, 
beyond ending the violence and withdrawing the military, actually “nurturing a new less 
fractured, collective memory, which is much less racial and hierarchical in terms of 
																																																								327	Mallavarapu,	Siddharth,	“Colonialism	and	the	Responsibility	to	Protect,”	319.	328	Ibid.	329	Bleie,	interview.	330	Ibid.	331	Ibid.	
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ethnicity.”332 Unfortunately, the painful memory of atrocity crimes typically “contributes 
to the existence of deep distrust between communities as well as towards government 
institutions.”333 In Bangladesh, a resolution to the conflict would likely also include an 
appreciation for the ways in which the Indigenous peoples of the CHT have attempted to 
protect themselves without labelling them terrorists or secessionists, in order for 
Bangladeshi society to move forward as a whole. An alternative understanding of R2P in 
relation to Indigenous peoples has the opportunity to take hold while the principle is still 
young, an understanding that is “rooted not in the international community’s ability to act 
but in the will of victims and civil society more generally to resist persecutions.”334   
 
V.   Policy choices re: Protecting Indigenous peoples 
b. What does this mean for the future of R2P as a norm? 
In terms of internationally recognized principles, it is important to keep in mind 
that “R2P is still a relatively new idea.”335 Unfortunately, the norm has been put into 
operation at the same time that it is being developed “conceptually and institutionally and 
politically”336 so this has caused “some steps backwards and … some unsettled areas.”337 
Dr. Edward Luck made the comparison between the literature on R2P and the fields of 
human rights and humanitarian affairs, both of which certainly took more than a decade 
to develop deep and thorough literatures, academic discourses and adequate mechanisms 
																																																								332	Ibid.	333	“A/70/999-S/2016/620,”	para.	56.	334	Mégret,	“Beyond	the	‘Salvation’	Paradigm,”	581.	335	Luck,	interview.	336	Ibid.	337	Ibid.	
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for operationalization.338 Luck acknowledges that the majority of the development of 
R2P has occurred in the “meeting halls of the UN,”339 which is important for 
internalizing the normative framework of the principle within the UN system and among 
Member States, but allows for debate only among the very privileged few who happen to 
be in those spaces. Luck has stated, however, that R2P and its potential application in 
mass atrocities faced by Indigenous peoples is one of the many “undertreated and under-
addressed”340 areas that are now beginning to be explored by academics, activists, and 
others.  
One of the issues with the application of the Responsibility to Protect in situations 
involving mass atrocity crimes is that R2P is stuck in a rubric of state sovereignty, which 
does not easily allow for its application in conflicts that cross national boundaries. 
Conflicts involving Indigenous peoples challenge this rubric because Indigenous 
communities are often spread across arbitrary national borders. In a move that further 
concerned critics of the nation-state focus of R2P, the September 2015 “Report of the 
Secretary-General on the United Nations and Conflict Prevention: A Collective 
Recommitment” emphasized the necessity of gaining the consent of the nation-state 
where this type of targeted violence is taking place, in order for the international 
community to step in to prevent a mass atrocity from taking place.341 It makes little sense 
to ask the governments committing crimes against their citizens or allowing these crimes 
to occur if they would allow international intervention, because they will certainly 
																																																								338	Ibid.	339	Ibid.	340	Ibid.	341	“S/2015/730”	(New	York,	United	States	of	America:	United	Nations	Security	Council,	September	25,	2015),	para.	2.	
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decline. Unfortunately, this means that as long as R2P remains shackled to the primacy of 
the nation-state, the principle itself will not be able to do much for the most vulnerable, 
those who are not being consulted on whether the international community is needed to 
step in and provide protection.  
However, this is not all to say that the concept of R2P should be tossed aside 
because its frame is outdated for the way the world is evolving. It has transformed before 
and it can transform again. As long as the incoming Secretary General retains a focus on 
R2P as Ban Ki-moon and Kofi Annan did, this emerging norm has a viable chance of re-
building consensus on how to handle the toughest security, human rights and 
humanitarian situations and of institutionalizing a system-wide approach to atrocity 
prevention within the United Nations. The day before the February 2016 UN General 
Assembly Thematic Panel Discussion on the Responsibility to Protect, a General 
Assembly resolution entitled “Responsibility to Protect” drafted by a diverse set of states 
was dispersed for review.342 This demonstrates that the concept still has the attention of 
Member States ten years into its existence. While Member States may continue to argue 
about R2P’s terms of engagement, there’s a broad sense that a multi-lateral response to 
mass atrocities is not inappropriate in and of itself.343 As the former Special Adviser to 
the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect, Jennifer Welsh, said at this 
same February 2016 panel discussion, R2P sets expectations and provides a 
framework for action.344 However, as with every other international principle, it 																																																								342	“Journal	of	the	United	Nations,	Programme	of	Meetings	and	Agenda:	February	25,	2016”	(Journal	of	the	United	Nations,	February	25,	2016),	http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/En/20160225e.pdf.	343	“Statement	by	Professor	the	Hon	Gareth	Evans	at	the	UN	General	Assembly	Thematic	Panel	Discussion,	26	February	2016:	Global	Centre	for	the	Responsibility	to	Protect.”	344	“Statement	by	Jennifer	Welsh,	Special	Adviser	to	the	UN	Secretary-General	on	the	Responsibility	to	Protect”	(United	Nations,	February	26,	2016),	
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cannot compel action in and of itself.345 As Welsh stated, “We must not shy away from 
a principle because it is demanding”;346 in fact, this should encourage the international 
community to invest in doing better. This includes ensuring that the Responsibility to 
Protect “extends beyond when the threat to populations is no longer imminent, and 
includes holding perpetrators accountable, […] restoring the peace and preventing the 
recurrence of violence.”347  
The future of R2P must see the norm “developed alongside a lot of other agendas 
and a lot of other priorities.”348 Operationally, R2P has to be invoked as part of “mixed 
strategies”349 in order to remain useful and relevant.  Situations that may require this 
more complex approach include instances of atrocity crimes that encompass “chronic 
human rights violations or situations such as Indigenous people and cultural 
relationships.”350 R2P must also be invoked in consultation with all relevant stakeholders 
because “international responses to atrocity crimes tend to be most effective when the UN 
and regional and sub-regional arrangements work closely together.”351 In his 2016 report 
entitled “Mobilizing Collective Action: The Next Decade of the Responsibility to 
Protect,” Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon emphasized the need to “encourage and 
support creative and bold innovations”352 by non-state actors in resolving atrocity crimes. 
The future of R2P is threatened, however, by the “erosion of the credibility of institutions 																																																																																																																																																																					http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/PGA%20Event%20RtoP%20at%20Ten%20Welsh.pdf.	345	Ibid.	346	Ibid.	347	Kuwali	and	Alfredsson,	“The	Responsibility	to	Protect	Minorities,”	68.	348	Luck,	interview.	349	Ibid.	350	Ibid.	351	“A/70/999-S/2016/620,”	para.	50.	352	Ibid.,	para.	52.	
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such as the United Nations”353 based on the discrepancy between UN promises and 
actions in recent years. While the 2016 Secretary-General R2P report “calls upon every 
member of the international community to speak out whenever and wherever atrocity 
crimes are being committed,”354 it is the responsibility of governments and the UN 
system to actually listen when those calls are being made—as they have been in 
Bangladesh for decades—and respond both appropriately and swiftly. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
The Responsibility to Protect is a norm with immense potential to prevent and 
help resolve situations of mass atrocities involving Indigenous peoples. However, the 
norm’s current iteration simply does not hold any space for the self-determination of 
those being victimized to make it a useful tool for Indigenous peoples and the struggles in 
which they are engaged. If R2P were to undergo a paradigm shift—part of which would 
include allowing the international community to acknowledge Indigenous identities and 
the rights associated therein, and paying attention to conflicts that challenge the dominant 
state-centric international order—then R2P could become a tool in the arsenal of 
Indigenous struggles the world over.  
When looking specifically at the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, the first 
step towards resolving this entrenched conflict is for the government to acknowledge 
there are Indigenous peoples within its borders. Not only does the government have the 
obligation to acknowledge the Indigenous identity of the “adibashi” of the CHT, but they 
must also create a timeline by which they will implement the clauses agreed upon in the 																																																								353	Ibid.,	para.	5.	354	Ibid.,	para.	63.	
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1997 Peace Accord. The international community needs to better supervise this 
implementation; it is not enough for the Bangladesh government to simply say they are 
doing it while their military continue to act with impunity and third party observers act as 
silent witnesses to the ongoing violence. 
 More research needs to be conducted on the potential for the successful 
application of R2P among Indigenous peoples, including further case studies. This author 
suggests focusing on the ways in which R2P and Indigenous self-determination could 
further reinforce rather than oppose one another. R2P has not been invoked in a situation 
of mass atrocities against Indigenous peoples for many reasons, but primarily because 
R2P simply is not yet appropriately formed to address the struggles experienced 
specifically by Indigenous peoples, including the inherent connection between loss of 
land, loss of culture, and loss of life. Ultimately, the Responsibility to Protect must 
remain “flexible enough, adaptable enough, and yet purposeful enough that it will 
continue to make some difference in peoples’ lives”355 as it contends with changing 
geopolitical and geostrategic factors and the contextual nuances that make each R2P 
application different from the last. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								355	Luck,	interview.	
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